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Summary findings
Analysis of the relationship between aid and growth by  Introducing these extreme shocks into the Burnside-
Burnside and Dollar found that the better a country's  Dollar regression, the authors find that they are highly
policies, the more effective aid is in raising growth in  significant: unsurprisingly, extreme negative shocks
that country. But this result has been criticized for being  reduce growth. Once these shocks are included, the
sensitive to choice of sample and for neglecting shocks.  Burnside-Dollar results become robust to choice of
Collier and Dehn incorporate export price shocks into  sample. Moreover, the adverse effects of negative shocks
the analysis of aid's effect on growth. They construct  on growth can be mitigated through offsetting increases
export price indices using the approach pioneered  by  in aid. Indeed, targeting aid to countries experiencing
Deaton and Miller. They locate shocks by differencing  negative shocks appears to be even more important for
the indices, removing predictable elements from the  aid effectiveness than targeting aid to countries with
stationary process, and normalizing the residuals.  good policies. But the authors  show that, overall, donors
Extreme negative shocks are the bottom  2.5 percent tail  have not used aid for this purpose.
of this distribution.
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Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterAid, Shocks,  and Growth
Paul Collier and Jan Dehn1. Introduction
Aid is a scarce resource, which needs to be allocated to maximum effect as part of global
efforts to reduce poverty. Recently, an 'aid effectiveness' literature has developed which
investigates quantitatively the criteria by which aid should be allocated. Bumside and
Dollar (2000) find that aid is more effective in increasing growth the better is
macroeconomic  policy. Collier and Dollar (2001) incorporate  differences in poverty into
the analysis and solve for a 'poverty-efficient' allocation of aid across countries. Such an
allocation equates the marginal efficiency of aid in reducing  poverty across recipients, aid
absorption being dependent both on the incidence of poverty and the level of policy.
Two potentially important weaknesses in this analysis are its sensitivity to choice of
sample, and is its omission of shocks. Hansen and Tarp (2001) show that the original
Bumside and Dollar result is not robust to the inclusion of cases which Burnside and
Dollar discard as outliers. Guillaumont  and Chauvet (2001) argue that negative terms of
trade shocks have adverse consequences for growth, and that the omission of such shocks
may result in an exaggerated effect of policy.
Many small developing countries are indeed highly shock-prone. Case studies of terms of
trade shocks such as those collected in Collier and Gunning and associates (1999)
conclude that negative shocks have substantial adverse consequences for growth. This is
supported by large-sample econometric analysis: Dehn (2001) finds that for 56
developing countries over the period 1970-93  negative terms of trade shocks have long
term effects on output. If shocks have effects on growth, their omission from the analysis
of aid effectiveness is potentially problematic. If macroeconomic  policy deteriorates
during shocks, potentially the result that aid is more effective the better is
macroeconomic  policy is spurious: policy might simply be proxying shocks. In this case
the Collier-Dollar  aid allocation formula would be misleading. Further, aid might be
effective in ameliorating the effect of shocks. In this case the Collier-Dollar formula
would be inadequate: a poverty-efficient  aid allocation formula would need to take
shocks into account.
The main difficulty in introducing shocks into the analysis of aid effectiveness is that the
level of economic activity is evidently endogenous to both policy and aid. Hence, shocks
need to be measured in such a way that they are unambiguously  exogenous. The
innovation of the present paper is to incorporate shocks into the aid-growth relationship
following the approach of Deaton and Miller (1995), whereby shocks are measured by an
index of export prices. Section 2 discusses of our measure of shocks. In Section 3 we
incorporate shocks into the Burnside-Dollar  model of aid and growth. We first test for
whether their results are robust to the inclusion of shocks, and then investigate whether
aid ameliorates the effect of shocks. Section 4 considers the implication of the results for
aid allocation.
22. Measuring Commodity  Price Shocks
In order to examine the effects of commodity  price shocks, we evidently need a
commodity price index. Our index follows the geometrically  weighted structure of the
index used by Deaton and Miller (1995):
DM=  Ptj  [1]
i
where W, is a weighting item and PI is the dollar international  commodity price for the
commodity i. Dollar prices measure cifborder prices. Historicalfob prices, which give a
preferable measure of the value of a commodity to the exporting country, are not
generally available. The weighting item, W,, is the value of commodity i in the total
value of all commodities, n, for the constant base period j:
E =  JIQ,,  [2]
W; is country specific so each country's aggregate commodity  price index is unique.
After taking logs, geometric weighting provides the rate of change of prices in first
differences, and avoids the numeraire  problem, which affects deflated arithmetically
weighted indices. The index, which is constructed using annual data for 113 developing
countries for the period 1957-1997,  is deflated by the export value index of industrialised
countries from International Financial Statistics. Further details on the structure and
coverage of the indices can be found in Dehn (2000a).
Most empirical case studies of trade shocks treat shocks as discrete events characterised
by large price changes (see for example  the collection of case studies in Collier, Gunning
and associates (1999)). For larger samples, a statistical approach to identifying temporary
shocks is necessary given the lack of information about suitable cut off points. We locate
shocks by differencing each country's aggregate real commodity price index series to
make it stationary, removing 'predictable' elements from the stationary process, and
nor:nalising the residuals. Finally, an extreme cut-off point, which is arbitrary but
consistent across countries, is applied to the stationary residuals from [3]. Shocks are
those observations, positive and negative, which exceed the critical value associated with
the 2.5% most extreme observations  in each tail.
The basic forecasting model used to identify shocks is the following:
Ayi, = a.  + alt +  +AYQ,  + AYij,-2 + s60;  [3]
t- =,..., 
Deaton (1992) notes the difficulties in unambiguously  deciding whether commodity
prices are I(1) or I(0). The relevant decision is therefore whether to select an I(1) or an
3I(0) specification arbitrarily (with the accompanying  risk of introducing pre-test
misspecification  errors) or whether to adopt a near-agnositic specification (where the risk
is a loss in efficiency). [31  is a useful specification,  because if the 'true' process is I(0),
[3] is exactly equivalent to an AR(2) in levels. To see this, simply rewrite as:
yi  = ao  + a1t + (A 1 +  + 062 -1  )Yi,- 2 +  ±,  [41
= y,  = a0 + alt  + *Y,,  +  *Yi,-2  + 
6'i,
Estimating the starred levels equation and unscrambling produces exactly the same
estimates of the {ca,  a,fl*  r }  parameters as from the non-starred equation. Inclusion of
the lagged level term in the difference equation implies that there are no restrictions and
the equation is therefore a reformulated  levels equation and not a differenced equation.
On the other hand, if the process is I(1), inclusion of the lagged level term is irrelevant
(except for using up one degree of freedom), since the coefficient will be estimated as
close to zero -OLS is in fact super-consistent and convergence  is very fast -although the
t-statistics have the Dickey-Fuller distribution and not the Student distribution. As
commodity prices are not clearly either I(0) or I(1) over the sample period, the agnostic
view is preferable to imposing fl2 = 0 on some commodities and not others, which would
introduce possible misspecification  error. The alternative of setting  62  = 0 everywhere is
unattractive, since some price series will at least appear to be I(0).
Using the 2.5% cut off, there are 179 positive shocks and 99 negative shock episodes for
the full 113 countries in the sample. The predominance  of positive shocks is not
surprising since the production of perishable commodities  under stochastic conditions
gives rise to large positive price spikes when stock-outs coincide with bad harvests
(Deaton and Laroque, 1992). Figures 1 and 2 respectively show the distribution of
positive and negative shocks for the 113 countries over the period 1957 to 1997 for a
range of cut off points (1% to 10%).  The vertical axis shows the proportion of countries,
which experienced shocks in any given year. The incidence of shocks increases
dramatically during the 1970s,  then declines, but remains higher than in the period prior
to the 1970s. Positive shocks are concentrated in the 1970s,  negative shocks in the 1980s.
Tables 1 and 2 show shock magnitudes and tests for differences in shock sizes across
different time periods, producer types and regions.' Magnitudes are measured as the
growth rate of prices in the year of the shock. On average positive shocks were the same
size as negative shocks. The positive shocks were concentrated during 1973-1985, and
the negative shocks during 1986-1997.  Oil shocks (positive and negative) were larger
than shocks affecting other commodities. The most shock-prone region was the Middle
East and North Africa.
While oil shocks are clearly important, it is noteworthy that the distribution of oil shocks
does not account for the overall distribution of shocks in the sample. Even in 1973-74 59
'To read table 2, read down the columns. The magnitude of shocks for the group at the top of each panel is compared with the
magnitudes of shocks for the groups listed on the left with stars indicating  the conventional levels of statistical significance.
4countries experienced  positive shocks, of which only 23 were oil producers. 2 No fewer
than 13 non-oil commodities were subject to shocks in 19733,  and 15 in 19744.  Similarly,
in 1986 40 countries 5 were exposed to negative commodity  price shocks as 10 different
commodities were subject to sharp downwards  price slumps .
The distribution of shocks is also not substantially  affected by the choice of deflator
(Figure 3). Most individual country commodity  price indices are 2 to 3 times as volatile
as the deflator 7. Even for the largest change in the MUV, an 11  % rise in 1986, the
average price change for the 40 countries with negative shocks in that year was 50%.
3. Shocks, Growth and Aid
We now introduce shocks into the Burnside and Dollar (2000) analysis of aid and growth.
They analyzed growth in 56 countries over the period 1970-93,  dividing the period into
four-year sub-periods over which growth was measured, yielding 336 observations of
growth episodes. In order to maintain precise comparability  with Burmside  and Dollar we
start from their sample of countries, their periodization, their measure of macroeconomic
policy, and their other explanatory  variables. Subsequently,  we introduce variations as
robustness checks.
The first column of Table 3 reproduces the Burnside and Dollar result. Controlling for a
few variables commonly found in growth regressions, the rate of growth over a four year
period is significantly  increased by better policy, and by the interaction of policy and aid:
aid and policy are complements. Aid here is measured as the net flow of Official
Development  Assistance, as a percentage of GDP.
These results are dependent upon the exclusion of outlier episodes for three very small
economies: Gambia, Guyana and Nicaragua. The second column of Table 3 reproduces
the regression including these outliers.
2 Countries with 1973 shocks: Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Chad, Chile, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali,
Mongolia, Niger, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,  Peru, Philippines, Seychelles, Singapore, Solomon  Islands, Sudan,
Thailand, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Zambia.
Countries 1974 shocks: Algeria, Angola, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bhutan, Cameroon, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Gabon,
Gambia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Senegal, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
'The  shocks in these 13 other commodities  were identified using the same methodology used to identify shocks in the aggregate
country indices. The extent to which shocks in individual price indices  feed through to aggregate indices is analysed in Dehn (2000b).
The 13 commodities referred to here are coffee, cotton, fishmeal, linseed oil, maize, rice, sisal, sorghum, soybean meal, soybean oil,
soybeans, wheat, and zinc.
4Coconut  oil, coconut oil (Philippines), groundnut oil, groundnuts, linseed  oil, palm kernels, palm oil, phosphate rock, rice(Thailand),
rice, sisal, soybean oil, sugar, super phosphates, and urea.
'Countries  with negative shocks in 1986: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina
Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  Egypt, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sudan,
Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
6 Cotton, groundnut oil, jute, nickel, crude oil, palm oil, sorghum, soybean oil, tin (Bolivia), and tin (other origins).
7These  differences are statistically significant at the 1% level with a few minor exceptions: South Africa's commodity index residuals
were less volatile than MUV. The commodity indices of the mixed producers were a little less than twice as volatile as MUV and only
significant at the 5% level. Finally,  the average standard deviation of all country indices for the period from 1957-1972  was 6.4%,
which is only slightly higher than the MUV standard deviation  of 5.2%.. The difference, however, was significant at the 1% level.
5The third column of Table 3 introduces commodity  price shocks. We use the full sample,
including the cases discarded as outliers by Burnside and Dollar. The measure described
in Section 2 is based on annual data. To apply it in the context of the Burnside and Dollar
analysis requires the construction of a variable, which describes commodity  price shocks
on the basis of their four-year episodes. Since there are far fewer price shocks than
episodes, most episodes either have no price shock or a single price shock. For these
cases we introduce two dummy variables, which take the value of unity when there is a
positive or a negative price shock respectively. These dummies are then interacted with
the size of the price shock. For a few episodes there are multiple price shocks. In these
cases we define the shock as the largest of the price changes (in absolute value). We
experimented with introducing further dummy variables for these subsidiary shocks but,
perhaps because of their infrequency, they were never significant and are not reported.
Thus, the variables for positive and negative shocks take the value zero if no such shock
occurred, and otherwise take the value of the largest price shock during the episode. Note
that our single-year price shock might occur in any one of the four years of a Burnside-
Dollar episode. The regression measures the impact on the growth rate during the
episode. Hence, the growth consequences  of the shock are tracked for the year of the
shock plus, on average, the subsequent eighteen months (with a range of 0-36 months).
Negative shocks significantly reduce the growth rate while positive shocks have no
significant effect. The introduction of positive and negative terms of trade shocks restores
the Burnside and Dollar results on the full sample. All three countries, which they discard
as outliers, experienced large export shocks. Both policy and the interaction of policy and
aid are significant.
We now investigate the interaction of aid and shocks. Potentially, aid has two types of
cushioning effects, one due to its initial level and the other due to any change coincident
with the shock. A persistently high level of aid might buffer the impact of export price
shocks because it reduces the proportionate  change in foreign currency inflows. Counter-
cyclical changes in aid might offset the effects of export price shocks by reducing the
absolute change in the foreign currency inflow. We test for the first or these effects by
introducing two additional variables. These are the interaction of the level of aid in the
previous four-year period with the positive and negative shock variables. The change in
aid could potentially be measured only during the year of the shock. However, even were
this significant, it would be of little interest: in practical terms it is not possible to
synchronize aid so closely with price movements. Hence, we measure the change in aid
between episodes. This measure is then interacted with the positive and negative shock
variables. Thus, in column four of Table 3 we add four interaction terms, testing for the
level and change in aid during positive and negative shocks.
Since positive shocks are themselves insignificant  in the growth process, it would seem
unlikely that aid would substantially  alter their effects. We find that the change in aid
interacted with positive shocks is indeed insignificant. The interaction of the previous
level of aid with positive shocks is statistically significant  at the 5% level: higher initial
levels of aid appear to enhance the effect of positive shocks. A possible mechanism by
which this might come about is that the higher is initial aid the lower will be the
6government's need to tax international  trade. With lower taxation of trade the windfall
accruing to the government will be smaller, while a greater proportion will accrue to the
private sector, which might handle it better. However, we do not test this speculation.
The more important results concern negative shocks. The interaction of the shock with
the initial level of aid is insignificant, but the interaction with the change in aid is
significant at 1%: increased aid mitigates the adverse effects of terms of trade
deterioration. To quantify this effect, consider the effect of the mean negative price shock
of 40%. The introduction of the interaction terms does not alter the previous result that
negative shocks significantly reduce the growth rate during the episode. Taking the
coefficient on the negative shock variable, a 40% price shock reduces growth by 1.38%
per year unless this effect is mitigated by an increase in aid. Thus, by the end of the
episode output is 5.5% lower and the total loss of output during the episode is equal to
around 14% of income in the initial year.'
To get some sense of the plausibility of these magnitudes it is useful to convert the price
shock into its direct implications for income. In the Appendix we show the approximate
direct loss of national income due to the fall in export prices. We measure the loss as a
percentage of pre-shock income, using the assumption that the quantity of exports is not
affected. On average, the negative price shocks constituted  a direct loss of income of
around 6.8% in the year of the shock. Hence, the multiplier from the initial loss of
income to the induced loss of output of 14% during the episode is around two. There are
various ways in which such a loss of output could come about. Prices might be slow to
adjust, yielding unemployment and a Keynesian  recession. Alternatively or additionally,
the income decline might reduce investment, and the reduction in the price of exports
might directly reduce labor supply. The implied size of the multiplier is not implausible,
and it is sufficiently large to be of policy concern. Even were the economy to fully
recover in the subsequent episode, the typical large negative shock analyzed here would
have cost around 21% of a year's income.
According to the coefficient on the interaction of the shock with the change in aid, for the
mean price shock this adverse growth would be fully offset were aid to increase by 0.81%
of GDP sustained over the four-year episode. 9 The amount of aid needed fully to offset
this decline in output is thus only around half the direct loss in income from the fall in the
price of exports. The implication that aid has a higher multiplier than income accruing to
exporters is surely implausible. However, the difference is within the confidence interval
of the estimated effects. To see this we compute the ranges of estimated growth effects
for the mean negative price shock (with its implied income loss of around 6.8%), and an
increase in aid during the four year episode totaling 6.8% of initial year income (i.e. an
annual increase in aid of around 1.7%).
Range of effects for the 95% confidence interval:
'The  average negative shock reduces growth -1.38% (40.5%*0.03398).  On an epoch basis (4 years), negative shocks therefore reduce
growth by: 4*-1.376/=5.50%.
'For  a 1%  change in aid, the average  negative price shock interacted with aid augments  growth by: 40.5% times 0.0418=1.69%/o.  On
an epoch basis, the aid provided is 4 times 1%,  i.e. 4%. Similarly, the off-set on growth is therefore also larger at: 4*1.690/0=6.77%.
7Evaluation point  Shock-  4-year  Shock*Change  4-year Growth
Growth  Growth  in Aid Growth  Effect (%/.)
Coefficient  Effect (%)  Coefficient
Mean  Extra Aid =
shock =  6.8% of initial
6.8% of  income
initial
income
Mean  -0.034  5.50  0.071  11.51
95% confidence interval  -0.062  10.04  0.116  18.666
(lower)
95% confidence interval  -0.006  0.97  0.027  4.352
(upper)
Even if the multiplier on aid is no higher than that on export income, the benefits from
aid during these severe negative shocks are considerable.  Recall that these beneficial
effects are over-and-above its normal effects on growth, since these are included in the
regression. To put these results in the perspective  of the original Bumside and Dollar
findings, the enhanced effectiveness  of aid on growth during severe negative shocks is
approximately equal to the difference between its effectiveness  in the best and the worst
policy environments under non-shock conditions.
We now test our results for robustness, changing our measure of price shocks and varying
the sample of countries.
We first construct alternative definitions of shocks. Variant 1 calculates shocks as the
average price change of all shocks during the epoch. This definition assumes that
relatively large and relatively small shocks have the same effects. Variant 2 is simply the
average commodity  price change during epochs in which the shock occurs, not just the
shock year-specific price change.  "0  The drawback of this definition relative to our initial
measure is that the average price over the epoch may take a sign opposite to the shock if,
for example, three moderately large negative price changes offset a positive shock within
an epoch. For example, during 1974-77,  Benin had a positive shock, but the average price
change for the entire epoch was -0.041. To avoid this, such episodes were dropped from
the sample of shocks, which is therefore smaller than for the two other definitions.
The first column in Table 4 replicates the last regression in Table 3 using as the epoch
shock measure the average shock price changes (rather than the largest shock price
change). This has virtually no effect on the magnitude of the shock effects. The second
column of Table 4 shows the other alternative specification  (average price changes for all
years during shock epoch). As this variable is generally smaller in magnitude, the
coefficient is larger, but the key regressions retain their significance and sign.
Another consideration  pertains to sample composition. Regression 3 in Table 4 drops all
oil producers." 1 Dropping oil countries has no impact on the results other than to slightly
increase the magnitude of the negative shock variable on growth. We take this to indicate
that shocks have important effects in a wide range of countries. It is well-known that aid
"' This variable is constructed as follows: (i) Obtain the average change in commodity prices for all four year epochs; (ii) Split the
price changes into positive and negative average price changes; (iii) Generate  two shock variables, which takes the value of 0 during
epochs without shocks, and the average price change during epochs with shocks.
"Defined  as those countries for which oil constitutes a 50% or larger  share of the exports in their commodity price index.
8regressions can be sensitive to the inclusion of Botswana, which has managed to secure
atypically high returns to aid. In column 4 of Table 4 we therefore drop Botswana from
the sample. We note that while the Burnside-Dollar result is sensitive to this exclusion,
our results are unaffected by this change.
Finally, in columns 5 we examine how the shock*aid relationship is supported in a
sample of African countries only. We observe that the link between aid and negative
shocks remains significant, even in this substantially smaller sample.
4. Shocks and the Allocation of Aid
We now investigate whether aid is in fact allocated in response to shocks. This is of both
econometric and policy significance. Burnside and Dollar are able to investigate the
effect of policy on aid without the need to instrument for aid because they show that aid
has not been allocated with reference to policy. If donors are in fact allocating aid with
reference to shocks then the above results will need to be revised accordingly.
With respect to aid*  shocks, our results suggest that economies indeed suffer adverse
growth consequences  from negative export price shocks and that aid is potentially useful
in ameliorating these effects. However, the implications for aid allocation are demanding.
In particular, a sustained high level of aid is not effective in ameliorating such shocks,
rather it is necessary for aid to increase coincident with the decline in export prices. The
previous shock-compensating  aid program, Stabex, a program run by the European
Union, notably failed in this respect. As shown by Herman et al. (1990) disbursement of
Stabex aid was so slow that it was actually  pro-cyclical. Stabex attempted to disburse aid
through projects, and such a modality inevitably imposes delays, which preclude speedy
response to price shocks. While the Stabex program was at least designed to address the
problem of negative commodity price shocks, in general aid has been unresponsive.
To measure this we incorporate such shocks into the Alesina-Dollar (2001) analysis of
donor behavior. Note that the episodes are now five-year periods not four-year periods. In
Table 5 the first column reproduces the Alesina-Dollar regression. Donor behavior is
readily explained by such factors as prior colonial status. The second column repeats the
regression for the smaller samnple  size necessitated by combining their data set with our
data on export price shocks. Note that since this involves dropping Israel from the
sample, we must also drop the dummy variable for that country. The reduced sample does
not significantly alter the results. In the third column we introduce a dummy variable
which takes the value of unity if there was a negative shock during the episode. The
variable is highly insignificant. Finally, in order to increase precision, we replace this
general dummy variable with five dummy variables, one for each of the five years during
the episode. Thus, for example,  if there was a negative export price shock in the second
year, this variable will be set to unity. Were donors reacting to shocks but with a lag then
we would expect those shocks that occurred early in the five-year episodes to
significantly increase average aid receipts during the period. None of the five dummy
variables is close to being significant. Hence, donors do not appear to have taken shocks
into account in determining their allocations of aid.
9This is scarcely surprising. Donors have lacked a modality for responding to export price
shocks. Project aid, which is the majority of aid, cannot be increased rapidly since the
flow of funds is determined by the timetables of project design and implementation.
Program aid could potentially respond to shocks but rapid increases are currently
constrained by the design of IMF programs. Programs are set for a three-year period and
increases in aid beyond those planned into the program are supposed to be accumulated
in foreign exchange reserves rather than spent. This is an obvious disincentive for donors
to provide shock-responsive  aid.
5. Conclusion
Within the Burnside-Dollar  framework of the effects of aid on growth during four-year
episodes, we have estimated the effects of large export price shocks. We have found that
negative shocks have substantial adverse effects on output, which even over a period of
four years or less are around twice as large as the direct loss of export income. Once such
shocks were included, the Burnside and Dollar result that aid is more effective in better
policy environments is robust to the changes in sample proposed by Hansen and Tarp
(2001) in their critique of Burnside and Dollar. The adverse effects of negative export
price shocks can, however, be mitigated by broadly contemporaneous  increases in aid.
The implied pay-off to aid targeted to shock compensation  is large relative to its normal
growth-enhancing effects, and is also large relative to the improvements in aid
effectiveness achievable from targeting aid onto better policy environments. In view of
this we investigated the extent to which aid has actually been systematically targeted to
countries suffering large negative terms of trade shocks. Incorporating shocks into the
Alesina-Dollar model of aid allocation, we found no evidence  that donors had been
responsive to them. Thus, both policy and adverse export price shocks should influence
aid allocations but have not in the past done so. As donors adjust their allocation rules to
take these circumstances into account, the effectiveness of aid in reducing poverty can be
expected to increase.
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14Table 1: Country  Shock Magnitudes, By Regional Affiliation, Producer  Type, and Time Period
Positive  Shocks  Negative  shocks
Category  n  obs  Positive  shocks  %  Stand.  Dev.  Negative  shocks  %  Stand.  Dev.
change  change
All countries  113 4633  44  26  44  21
Sub-Saharan  Africa  44  1804  41  22  34  18
Middle  East  and  North  Africa  16  656  75  27  69  17
Latin  America  17  697  37  18  33  16
SouthAsia  5  205  34  18  51  15
EastAsia  11  451  38  19  49  13
Pacific  5  205  30  13  46  19
Caribbean  14  574  38  26  31  23
South  Africa  1  41  na  na  na  na
Agricultural  foodstuffs  52  2132  34  16  27  12
Agricultural  non-foods  18  738  31  13  34  14
Non-agricultural  non-oil  17  697  38  22  48  14
Oil  23  943  76  23  72  11
Mixed  3  123  21  6  32  3
1957-1972  113  1808  20  na  27  14
1973-1985  113  1469  47  27  35  15
1986-1997  113  1356  34  17  45  23
15Table 2: Tests  for Equality of Country Shock  Magnitudes, By Region, Producer  Type, and Time Period
Positive  shock magnitudes,  regional comparison
Sub-Saharan  Middle East  Latin America  South  East Asia  Pacific
Africa  and North  Asia
Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East and North  Africa  -33.6...
Latin America  0  37.5**^
South Asia  0  41.4***  0
East Asia  0  36.5***  0  0
Pacific  11.2*  44.8***  0  0  0
Caribbean  0  36.9***  0  0  0  0
Negative shock  magnitudes, regional  comparison
Sub-Saharan  Middle East  Latin America  South  East Asia  Pacific
Africa  and North  Asia
Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East and North  Africa  -35.3**
Latin America  0  35.6*-
South Asia  -17.3**  18.0**  -17.6*'
East Asia  0  28.2***  0  10.1*
Pacific  -12.2*  23.1**  -12.5***  0  0
Caribbean  0  37.7**  0  19.6**  0  0
Positive shock  magnitudes, producer  type comparison
Agricultural  Agricultural  Non-  Oil
foodstuffs  non-foods  agricultural
non-oil
Agricultural foodstuffs
Agricultural non-foods  0
Non-agricultural  non-oil  0  4.9*
Oil  -41.7***  44.3***  -37.3***
Mixed  13.0**  10.5**  17.4**  54.8***
Negative shock  magnitudes, producer  type comparison
Agricultural  Agricultural  Non-  Oil
foodstuffs  non-foods  agricultural
non-oil
Agricultural foodstuffs
Agricultural non-foods  -6.7**
Non-agricultural  non-oil  -1  3.7***  -7.0*
Oil  -43.1  -36.4***  -29.4***
Mixed  0  0  9.8*  39.2-*
Positive  shock  magnitudes,  time period comparison
1957-1972  1973-1985
1957-1972
1973-1  985  Na
1986-1997  Na  12.3***




1986-1997  -18.2**  -11.1***
16Table  3
Dependent  variable:  GDP  growth rate  per capita
Regression  no.  1  2  3  4
Burnside
Bumside  Dollar  (full
Bumside  Dollar  (full  sample)  and
Variable name  Dollar  sample)  shocks  Shock  * Aid
Initial Income  -0.60  -0.62  -0.59  -0.77
(0.59)  (0.58)  (0.55)  (0.59)
Ethnolinguistic  Fractionalisation  -0.42  -0.56  -0.41  -0.38
(0.75)  (0.74)  (0.74)  (0.78)
Assassinations  -0.45  *  -0.44  -0.40  -0.37
(0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.29)
Ethnolinguistic  Fractionalisation Assassinations  0.79  *  0.80 *  0.68  0.63
(0.46)  (0.46)  (0.46)  (0.48)
Institutional  Quality  0.69  **  0.64  0.64 ***  0.67
(0.18)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0a19)
M2/GDP  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)
SSA  -1.87  **  -1.60 **  -1.76  **  -2.05
(0.78)  (0.75)  (0.77)  (0.73)
EASIA  1.31  0.96  1.29  1.21
(0.60)  (0.58)  (0.60)  (0.64)
Policy  0.71  ***  0.97  0.69 ***  0.82
(0.20)  (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.19)
Aid  -0.02  0.01  -0.09  -0.20
(0.16)  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.13)
Aid  Policy  0.19  **  0.01  0.21  0.10
(0.07)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06)
ed3  -0.01  -0.01  -0.26  1.31
(0.59)  (0.59)  (0.59)  (0.71)
ed4  -1.41  **  -1.37 **  -1.42 **  0.53
(0.65)  (0.65)  (0.66)  (0.69)
ed5  -3.47  ***  -3.39 ***  -3.34 ***  -1.32
(0.61)  (0.60)  (0.62)  (0.64)
ed6  -2.01  ***  -1.98  -1.17 **  0.62
(0.54)  (0.54)  (0.55)  (0.55)
ed7  -2.26  -2.33  -2.03
(0.66)  (0.65)  (0.67)
Negative  shocks  -0.03  -0.03
(0.01)  (0.01)
Positive  shocks  0.02  0.00
(0.01)  (0.01)
Negative  shocks  change  in aid  0.04
(0.0  1)
Positive  shocks * change  in aid  0.00
(0.02)
Negative  shocks  * lagged  level  aid  0.01
(0.00)
Positive  shocks * lagged  level  aid  0.02
(0.01)
N (countries)  56  56  56  56
n (observations)  270  275  275  234
F  16.750 ***  17.080  ***  15.530  *  15.030
Rsq  0.394  0.392  0.417  0.458
17Table 4
Dependent  variable:  GDP growth  rate per capita
Regression  no.  1  2  3  4  5
Drop
Alternative  Altemative  Botswana
Shock  Shock  (Atypical  Aid-  African
Measurement  Measurement  Dropping  Oil  Growth  Countries
Variable  name  #1  #2  Producers  Country)  Only
Initial Income  -0.78  -0.76  -0.62  -0.90  -0.98
(0.59)  (0.56)  (02)  (0.59)  (1.73)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalisation  -0.39  -0.10  -0.19  -0.24  1.04
(0.78)  (0.82)  (0.84)  (0.78)  (1.94)
Assassinations  -0.37  -0.34  -0.39  -0.34  4.18
(0.29)  (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.29)  (8.36)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalisation 'Assassinations  0.63  0.55  0.75  0.53  -5.59
(0.48)  (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.49)  (14.59)
Institutional Quality  0.68  .-  0.70  0.91  0.62  - 0.91
(0.19)  (019)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.55)
M2/GDP  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.06
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.05)
SSA  -2.05  -2.03 ...  -2.32 ...  -2.28 -
(0.73)  (0.76)  (0.71)  (0.73)
EASIA  1.21  0.98  0.14  1.30 *-
(0.64)  (0.64)  (074)  (0.63)
Policy  0.82  0.93  0.96  0.78  --  1.97  **
(0.19)  (0.19)  (0.22)  (0.18)  (080)
Aid  -0.20  -0.12  -0.09  -0.22  0.01
(0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.25)
Aid  Policy  0.10  *  0.05  0.06  0.06  -0.08
(0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (o.05)  (0.16)
ed3  1.31  1.95  1.09
(0.70)  (0.72)  (0.70)
ed4  0.52  0.83  -0.38  0.28  -0.71
(0.69)  (0.72)  (0.69)  (0.69)  (1.63)
ed5  -1.32 **  -1.13  -2.54  -1.52  -2.31
(0.64)  (0.64)  (0.69)  (0.64)  (1.68)
ed6  0.62  0.83  -0.65  0.51  -0.69
(0.56)  (0.55)  (0.56)  (0.57)  (1.26)
ed7  -1.81 *  -2.29
(0.73)  (1.74)
Negative shocks  -0.03  -0.61  -0.04  -0.03 *-  -0.02
(0.01)  (0.23)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.04)
Positive shocks  0.00  -0.25  0.02  0.00  -0.03
(0.01)  (0.22)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.04)
Negative shocks *change  in aid  0.04  0.71  0.04  0.04  0.06
(0.01)  (0.25)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)
Positive shocks * change in aid  0.00  0.19  0.00  0.00  -0.05
(0.02)  (0.25)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Negative shocks * lagged level aid  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.01  0.01
(0.00)  (0.12)  (0.00)  (0 00)  (0.01)
Positive shocks * lagged level aid  0.02  0.63  0.00  0.02  0.02
(0.01)  (0.18)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)
N (countries)  56  56  47  55  21
n  234  234  197  231  74
F  15.010  14.550  *  11.840  13.910  *  8.760
Rsq  0.458  0.465  0.492  0.454  0.417
18Table  5
Dependent  variable:  Log  of Aid  (five  year  averages)  1970-1994
Regression  no.  1  2  3  4
3 with within-
Alesina-Dollar  Alesina-Dollar  epoch  shock
Variable  name  (their  sample) (shock  sample)  2 with  shocks  dummies
Log  (initial  income)  6.58  7.29 - 7.29  ...  7.27
(1.22)  (1.02)  (1.02)  (1.04)
[Log(initial  income)]  squared  -0.49  **  0.53  0.53 **  -0.53
(0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)
Log (population)  1.61  1.01  0.99  1.01
(0.79)  (0.54)  (0.54)  (0.54)
[Log  (population)]  squared  -0.04  -0.02  -0.02  -0.02
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
Openness  0.41  0.38  '  0.37 *  0.35
(0.15)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.12)
Democracy  -0.14 *-007  -0.07  -0.07
(0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)
US  UN Friend  -0.01  -0.04  -0.04  -0.04
(002)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)
Japan  UN Friend  0.16 ***  0.10  0.10  0.10
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)
Log (years  as colony)  0.27  0.11  0.11  0.12
(0.06)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)
Egypt  1.44  1.52  1.52  1.53
(0.15)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (015)
Israel  6.81
(2.21)
Muslim  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Roman  Catholic  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
(0.00)  (0.00)  (000)  (000)
Other  0.00 *  0.00  0.00  0.00
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
Negative  shocks  0.06  0.27
(0.10)  (0.22)
Negative  shock  * Second  Year  -0.36
(0.26)
Negative  shock  ' Third  Year  -0.07
(0.27)
Negative  shock  * Fourth  Year  -0.24
(0.49)
Negative  shock  * Fifth  Year  -0.55
(0.50)
N (countries)  85  80  80  80
n  397  372  372  372
F  58.850  58.140  53.080  ***  49.010
Rsq  0.625  0.661  0.661  0.663
19Appendix 1: Shock magnitudes
Positive shocks
Commodity
Year of  Share in GDP  Value of shock
Country  Shock  (%, 1990)  (% of GDP)
Algeria  1974  3.73  2.65
Cameroon  1974  9.06  3.03
Cameroon  1976  9.06  2.82
Cameroon  1979  9.06  2.76
Colombia  1974  9,45  4.03
Colombia  1976  9.45  4.02
Colombia  1979  9.45  3.62
Costa Rica  1976  11.95  4.71
Dominican Republic  1988  8.43  5.28
Ecuador  1974  21.94  9.25
Ecuador  1979  21.94  11.34
Egypt  1974  2.22  1.10
Egypt  1979  2.22  0.97
El Salvador  1976  4.44  3.19
El Salvador  1977  4.44  2.34
Gabon  1974  41.36  25.19
Gabon  1979  41.36  26.30
Gambia  1974  4.52  1.88
Guatamala  1976  8.52  4.08
Guyana  1979  56.56  5.61
Guyana  1983  56.56  9.16
Guyana  1988  56.56  14.40
Haiti  1976  0.70  0.86
Haiti  1977  0.70  0.88
Honduras  1976  14.02  5.54
India  1976  1.06  0.16
India  1984  1.06  0.16
Indonesia  1974  10.06  6.56
Indonesia  1979  10.06  6.61
Jamaica  1983  20.04  6.82
Kenya  1976  4.41  2.82
Kenya  1977  4.41  5.31
Kenya  1984  4.41  2.72
Korea, Republic of  1979  0.31  0.07
Madagascar  1976  3.69  2.26
Malawi  1989  20.58  3.70
Malaysia  1974  19.98  12.36
Malaysia  1979  19.98  11.83
Mexico  1974  3.98  2.70
Mexico  1979  3.98  3.29
Morocco  1974  4.57  5.70
Nicaragua  1976  27.60  9.10
Niger  1973  0.18  0.04
Niger  1976  0.18  0.07
Niger  1979  0.18  0.02
Nigeria  1974  44.79  31.71
Nigeria  1979  44.79  39.72
Paraguay  1976  15.35  5.15
Philippines  1974  2.99  0.54
Senegal  1974  4.43  3.19
Sierra Leone  1988  4.56  1.84
Sri Lanka  1983  7.48  2.14
Syrian Arab Republic  1974  13.73  9.58
Syran  Arab Republic  1979  13.73  10.65
Thailand  1988  3.30  0.55
Togo  1974  13.83  13.61
Trinidad & Tobago  1974  16.93  12.96
Trinidad & Tobago  1979  16.93  13.70
Venezuela  1974  21.34  13.93
Venezuela  1979  21.34  16.52







Commodity  Value  of
Year  of  Share  in GDP  shock  (%  of
Country  Shock  (%,1990)  GDP)
Argentina  1986  2.64  -0.80
Bolivia  1975  10.04  -5.90
Bolivia  1986  10.04  -3.12
Cameroon  1986  9.06  -3.25
Chile  1975  14.01  -10.12
Colombia  1986  9.45  -3.88
Costa  Rica  1987  11.95  -3.91
Costa  Rica  1992  11.95  -2.29
Cote  d'lvoire  1981  15.44  -4.60
Dominican  Republic  1986  8.43  -1.50
Ecuador  1986  21.94  -11.48
Egypt  1986  2.22  -1.07
El Salvador  1987  4.44  -2.81
El Salvador  1992  4.44  -0.87
Gabon  1986  41.36  -28.27
Gambia  1992  4.52  -1.43
Ghana  1981  17.68  -5.61
Guatamala  1987  8.52  -3.47
Guatamala  1992  8.52  -1.56
Honduras  1987  14.02  -4.54
Honduras  1992  14.02  -2.47
Indonesia  1986  10.06  -7.24
Malaysia  1986  19.98  -12.05
Mali  1986  8.79  -2.47
Mexico  1986  3.98  -3.11
Nicaragua  1992  27.60  -4.72
Nigeria  1986  44.79  -39.36
Pakistan  1986  2.18  -0.66
Paraguay  1986  15.35  -3.61
Peru  1975  4.72  -3.03
Sierra  Leone  1981  4.56  -1.94
Somalia  1974  4.70  -0.83
Syrian  Arab  Republic  1986  13.73  -10.91
Trinidad  & Tobago  1986  16.93  -13.76
Tunisia  1986  6.01  -3.99
Venezuela  1986  21.34  -16.09
Zaire  1975  10.15  -5.79
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